Could a quantum computer break the security measures we rely on every day?
When we log in to our bank, send documents to a business partner, use an online store, or connect to a company system, we rarely think about what is happening behind the scenes. We see a login form, a padlock next to the website address, and a message saying the connection is secure.
But behind all this are cryptographic mechanisms. They help protect information being transmitted, verify users’ identities, and check whether data has been altered.
Many of these solutions rely on mathematical problems that are very difficult for classical computers to solve. This is why we can safely use encrypted connections, digital signatures, and certificates.
The problem arises when quantum computers enter the picture.
They are not simply faster computers that perform the same operations in less time. They use entirely different principles for processing information. For certain tasks, they may achieve capabilities beyond the reach of classical machines.
One such application could be breaking some of the cryptographic algorithms commonly used today to secure information.
Does this mean someone will break the security of banks, online stores, and company systems tomorrow? No. Quantum computers capable of carrying out such large-scale attacks do not yet exist. Nor is there a firm date for when they will be built.
That does not mean, however, that the problem can be ignored entirely.
What exactly is at risk?
It is worth starting with an important distinction. Not all cryptographic mechanisms are equally vulnerable to advances in quantum computing.
Two types of solutions are particularly important today:
1. Asymmetric cryptography
These mechanisms use a pair of related keys: a public key and a private key. One can be shared with others, while the other must remain secret.
These solutions are used, among other things, for:
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securely establishing encryption keys,
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authentication,
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digital signatures,
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verifying the authenticity of certificates.
Well-known algorithms in this group include RSA and solutions based on elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC).
A sufficiently large, fault-tolerant quantum computer could use Shor’s algorithm to solve the mathematical problems on which the security of these methods is based. In practice, this would make it possible to break some safeguards that we consider secure today.
2. Symmetric cryptography
In this case, the same secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt information. One example is AES, which is used in many systems and data security solutions.
Symmetric cryptography is not at risk in the same way as RSA or ECC. Grover’s algorithm gives quantum computers a theoretical advantage when searching a key space, but this does not mean that all symmetric ciphers can simply be broken.
In practice, this risk can be mitigated by using appropriately chosen key lengths.
This is important because post-quantum cryptography does not mean that absolutely all encryption mechanisms need to be replaced. Changes must be carefully considered and tailored to specific use cases.
A threat that already exists today: harvest now, decrypt later
There is another reason why companies should not put off this topic until some distant future.
In cybersecurity, the phrase harvest now, decrypt later describes an approach that could be translated as “collect now, decrypt later.”
Imagine a situation in which someone intercepts a company’s encrypted communications. Today, they cannot read them because the security measures in place are too difficult for them to break.
However, they could retain the intercepted data and wait for technology to advance. If a quantum computer capable of breaking the algorithm in use becomes available in the future, some of the information collected earlier may become readable.
So you do not need to have a quantum computer today to potentially prepare for this kind of attack.
This is particularly important for data that remains valuable for many years, for example:
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design and technical documentation,
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information about a company’s strategy,
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research and development data,
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financial documents and contracts,
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trade secrets,
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data relating to critical infrastructure.
Not every piece of information stored today will be equally attractive to a potential attacker. The key considerations are how long the data needs to remain confidential and what the consequences of its disclosure in the future would be.
This is the kind of assessment companies should start with.
Post-quantum cryptography—what exactly is it?
This brings us to a term that appears increasingly often in cybersecurity documents: Post-Quantum Cryptography, or PQC.
Put simply, these are cryptographic methods designed to withstand attacks carried out by both classical computers and known attack methods that use quantum computers.
One thing is worth clarifying: post-quantum cryptography does not mean encryption performed by a quantum computer. These solutions can run on ordinary computers, servers, and devices, but they are based on different mathematical principles from some of the algorithms currently in use.
Work on these solutions has been underway for years. One of the most important organizations involved in their standardization is the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
In August 2024, NIST published the first three finalized post-quantum cryptography standards:
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FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) - a standard for a key-encapsulation mechanism. It helps establish a shared secret securely, which can then be used to encrypt communications.
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FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) - a digital signature standard that can be used, among other things, to verify the authenticity and integrity of documents or messages.
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FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) - another digital signature standard, based on a different mathematical construction from ML-DSA.
This is a significant milestone. We are no longer talking solely about research and experimental solutions. Approved standards now exist that can be used to design and develop systems resilient to future quantum threats.
Why isn’t it enough to simply update encryption?
A reasonable question to ask is: since new standards already exist, why can’t companies simply replace old algorithms with new ones?
Because cryptography isn’t a single add-on that can be uninstalled and replaced with another.
Cryptographic mechanisms are often deeply embedded in software architecture. They may be used in server-to-server communications, login systems, certificates, document signing, integrations with external services, or devices used by an organization.
Changing one component can affect how many others work.
Compatibility is another issue. New algorithms may require larger keys, signatures, or additional data to be sent during communication. This, in turn, can affect performance, the size of transmitted packets, memory usage, and hardware requirements.
It also matters whether the external systems an application communicates with support the new solutions.
For example, a company might modernize its own application but still use an external system that doesn’t support the relevant mechanisms. In that case, a full migration won’t be possible without taking that provider into account.
That’s why preparing for post-quantum cryptography is primarily an architectural and organizational task, not merely an update to a software library.
Where should a company start?
Not every organization needs to implement new algorithms immediately. However, any company that develops its own software or processes important data can start preparing for the changes.
The most sensible approach involves several stages.
1. Check where cryptography is used
The first step is to take inventory. Identify which cryptographic algorithms, protocols, certificates, and libraries are used in the company’s systems.
Checking the website alone isn’t enough. Cryptography may also be present in mobile apps, internal systems, integrations, VPN connections, databases, and software supplied by external partners.
2. Assess the value of data and how long it must remain confidential
Not all data requires the same level of protection for the same length of time.
Information that loses its value after a few days should be treated differently from technical documentation, trade secrets, or data that should remain confidential for a dozen or several dozen years.
It is the latter that may require special attention due to the risk of harvest now, decrypt later.
3. Check dependencies on providers
Modern systems use many external services. It is therefore worth finding out whether providers of cloud services, payment systems, software, libraries, and infrastructure plan to support post-quantum standards.
Without this, even a well-prepared application may encounter limitations when interfacing with other solutions.
4. Plan the migration
Only after gathering this information can you determine the order of operations. It’s worth addressing systems that process the most sensitive data first, as well as those that will take the longest to replace or modernize.
This doesn’t have to mean rebuilding the entire IT environment all at once. In many cases, a gradual migration carried out in controlled stages is a better solution.
5. Design with future changes in mind
This is one of the most important points for companies developing their own applications.
A system should not be designed so that changing a cryptographic algorithm requires rebuilding many independent modules.
It’s worth ensuring that cryptographic mechanisms are appropriately separated from the rest of the application logic, and that configuring and updating them doesn’t require changes to every part of the system.
Crypto-agility: readiness for change
In this context, the concept of crypto-agility, or cryptographic agility, is becoming increasingly important.
It means a system’s ability to change the cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms it uses without having to rebuild the entire application or infrastructure.
Why is this so important?
Because cryptography isn’t a field where a chosen solution stays current forever. Standards can change, new threats emerge, and some algorithms may eventually be deemed insufficiently secure.
If an application is strongly dependent on one particular algorithm, replacing it can be costly and risky.
If, on the other hand, the architecture allows cryptographic mechanisms to be changed in a controlled way, the organization has much greater flexibility.
This isn’t just about quantum computers. It’s a good software design practice that makes it easier to respond to future changes in cybersecurity.
Does every company need to implement post-quantum cryptography right now?
No. And it’s worth saying that clearly.
Not every company needs to migrate all its systems immediately. Not every application processes information that must remain confidential for several decades. Nor does every IT environment have the same technical capabilities and dependencies on external providers.
However, there are organizations for which preparing for these changes should be one of the more important parts of technology planning. This applies especially to companies processing data with long confidentiality periods, critical infrastructure operators, financial institutions, the public sector, and enterprises developing complex IT systems.
It is also worth distinguishing technical recommendations from legal obligations. NIST publishes standards and migration timelines primarily for U.S. federal systems. This does not automatically mean that the same deadlines are legally binding for all businesses in Poland or the European Union.
In October 2026, NIST published its final report, IR 8547, which describes the direction and timeline for transitioning to post-quantum standards in systems covered by U.S. guidelines. This is an important point of reference for the technology industry, but it should not be confused with a universal legal deadline for companies operating in Europe.
Future security starts with the decisions made today
Quantum computers are not currently tools that can arbitrarily break the security measures protecting today’s internet. Nor is it known exactly when machines capable of attacking widely used cryptography will emerge.
We do know, however, that the threat is significant enough for the first international post-quantum cryptography standards to have already been developed. We also know that transitioning to new solutions takes time, testing, cooperation with providers, and careful preparation of system architecture.
That’s why the most important question today isn’t: “When will a quantum computer break our security measures?”.
A much more practical question is: “Will our systems be able to transition safely to new solutions when the time comes?”
For companies developing their own software, this is a good time to consider security not only in terms of current threats, but also future technological changes.
At Web24, we treat software architecture as the foundation for its continued development. That is why, when designing and modernizing systems, it is worth considering not only today’s requirements, but also the ability to adapt to the standards that will shape digital security in the years to come.
Because a well-designed system should not only work today. It should also enable secure changes tomorrow.
